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INTRODUCTION

Hum srous books and thousands of articles have been written
about t e New Deal, its aims, objectives, and leaders.

It is

likely that all of the material that has been written has been
the out-spoken thoughts of the various writers.

Much of the

material has been criticism both constructive and destructive,
that is to say some of the suggestions that have been offered
if

put into practice would have been helpful while others would

have been detrimental.
The material that has been cous ructive has been the result
of careful thought on the part of the writer, while the other has
hot.

That constructive material which I have found has been classi

fied as scientific and therefore as reliable and useful.
Although scientific material has been mther difficult to ob
tain, it has been the aim of the writer to use only that material
which, in the main, has been written for scientific reasons with
a logical approach.

Hie author will not attempt to criticize or

put forth new policies that would alleviate the economic pressure
that is bearing upon the nation, but only to collect and preserve
in a simple yet factual manner some of the monetary policies that
have been experimented with and placed in practice during the life
of the New Deal.

Chapter I
Economic Causes of the New Deal
A - The Depression

The existing state of economic strain has not always existed,
nor is it likely that it will continue forever.

Depressions, it

has been discovered by eminent economists, are only phases of great
business cycles and that due to the imperfections in our economic
structure they are nearly regular occurences.

According to Professor

Lionel D. Edie, Professor of Finance, University of Chicago - "Busi
ness Cycle" is a phrase used to designate the series of changes in
business activity which are characterized by alternating prosperity
and depression.

The phrase serves to emphasize the observed fact

that the typical condition in business is not permanent prosperity.
Instead, it is a constant series of changes - from prosperity to
crisis, from crisis to depression,

rom depression to recovery,

from recovery back to prosperity again.

This succession of c anges

is not exceptional or unusual, but is the eustomary and e3q)ected
round of business behavior.

Then business is at a peak of good

times, it is on the verge of depression.

Then business is in the

slough of despond, it is on the threshold of recovery.

Ebb and flow

between good times and bad times is the essential charateristic of
the business cycle.
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However, the ups and downs of business do not occur with the
exact regularity with which a pendulum swings back and forth*
two business cycles are of exactly the same duration.

No

No two cycles

have exactly the same rise and fall of prices of production.

No

two cycles have exactly the same background of fundamental economic
conditions.

Each cycle has an individuality of its own.

Neverthe

less, in spite of all such individual differences and variations
all cycles run true to type.
general bet&vior.

They follow well defined lines of

They have fundamental forces.

The individual

peculiarities of each cycle exist within limitB clearly defined by
the basic common characteristics of all cycles.

Two errors are

equally to be avoided; the one, exaggeration of the notion that a
cycle runs sterotyped, fixed, and absolutely periodic courses; the
other, exaggeration of the notion that the ups and downs of business
are chaotic or haphazard phenomena which obey no general laws.^
It is quite plain from the above observations that our present
depression is not the first nor the last of periodic occurences.
Nor is it possible for the present economic disorder to last with
out recover returning.

So with the knowledge that the depression

is only one phase of the economic order and that money is likely
to fluctuate during the phase, we can see clearly the problem of
attempting to stabalize the fluctuations of money and at the same
time woik toward recovery.

A brief review of the depression will

Lionel D. Sdie, Economics: Principles and Problems,
(Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York - 1926) p. 579 Vol. 1

bring vividly before us the almost sudden eImage from economic se
curity to economic insecurity.
"Let us begin with a bird's eye-view of the United
the spring of 1929.

tates in

From that pleasant elevation we see farmers

working in their fields.

i ome are ploughing, digging and cultivating;

others are spraying orchards or herding cattle and sheep.

Later we

see th«a gathering their cro )s and herds and shipping them to market,
e note the farmers making frequent trips to town and emerging from
the general stores with numerous bags and bundles.

e note also the

automobile of the rural free delivery bringing numerous packages,
presumably from the mil order houses.

The farm produce is brought

by wagon and trucks to the railroad and presently we see long freight
trains creeping over land to distant cities.

<Te see factories, mills

and mines, and men converging toward thai each morning.

a see trains

and trucks bringing raw materials and other trucks and trains carry
ing away cases of the finished goods.

These c^ees go to distributing

centers; they are distributed to stores of ell kinds and we perceive
the working men going to these stores and returning with aimfuls of
packages.

Almost everyone i3 busy and though few seem to be supply

ing solely their own needs, all seem to get some share of the things
which their neighbors are so busy making.
From our aerial vantage point, of eourse,

e cannot discern the

green and white papers that make this exchange possible.

It mi^ht

seam to us like sorae gigantic schane of cooperation or barter.
Sveryone seems to be bus ing himself in one fashion or another and
to receive a widespread assortment of goods.

There is to be sure

much activity which seerus from our lofty position like so ;uch aim-

4.

less running about.

But we nay assume that it has some relation to

the whole business of making and exchanging goods.
Then one day in the autumn of 1929 we notice a * reat commotion
in one of the larger eastern cities. People scurry back and forth
in its narrow streets in great frenzy.

The focus of all this commo

tion is a few little white buildings at the top of a narrow island.
Soon the factory smoke ceases, man turn sadly away and we see
them gathering around employment bureaus, lounging in city paries
and finally standing for hours in bread lines. The fermers,
listlessly about their work.
picked.

too go

Fields go unharvested, orchards un

Railroad trains are shorter and less frequent.

The con

struction of office buildings, hotels and apartment houses gradually
grow less. This is accompanied by reduced activity in steel mills
and locomotive works.

As one group of factories suspend and its

discouraged employees drifting to beg for work and food we see other
factories which were supplying these people with gpoAa lay off aaployees and at length shut down."

(1)

The above paragraphs describe in a picturesque yet simple and
truthful manner the beginning of the depression.

To put the picture

more clearly before us, let us examine figures and percentages com
piles by F. C. Mills and Simon Knuznets.

"Between the years 1929

and 1932 the total physical output of goods in the country had been
reduced 37 per cent; total labor income in all industries had de
clined 40 per cent, dividends had dropped 57 per cent but interest

U )l .

Hucker, A Short History of the Hew Deal (The Macmillan Co.,

New York) 1933.

p. 18.
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had dropped only 3 per cent.

The seasonally adjusted index of

Industrial production(in terms of 19r3-25 as 100) in Parch stood
at 59, that of construction at 14, that of factory payrolls at 37
(unadjusted), and that of freight car loadings at 50; the farmers
dollar in the form of purchasing power, was worth 50 cents." ^
With factories idle, farm products bringing low prices and
every other field of endeavor closed unemployment quickly rose and
thus another link in our economic chain was broken.

With such

impetus the depression gained headway rapidly.

B - Une iploy ent as an Sconoiaic Cause
With unemployment gaining headway so rapidly it became im
possible for the neighborhood to deal with the problem and orga
nized relief became prevalent in all of the cities and towns in
factory areas.

In March 1933 according to data compiled by the

National Bureau of Economic Research, between 13 and 20 million
people were unalloyed in the United States and each year since
than the number has steadily increases.
Stuart Chase, says of the incident, "In the early months of
1932 a squadron of five hundred investigators for the Htoergsncy
elief Bureau of New York, made a house to house survey of 6,304
families in the city.

None of the cases were known to any family

elfare society, being too ignorant or too proud to apply for orga*

x

nized relief, but all were narked "urgent." Th© chief breadwinner
^Horace Taylor, at. al., Contemporary Problems (Harcourt,
4 Co., New York 19. 4-35 ed.) Vo. I. p. 4.

race
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had been unemployed from four months to two years with an average
of eight months.

The following somber figures tabulate the results

of the investifation:5,122 families - 81 per cent of all lacked food.
5,516 families - 88 per cent were in arrears on
rent.
2,387 families - 38 per cent lacked winter
clothing.
Shoes were being stuffed with playing c rds
for soles; children were too cold and too
shabby to go to school.
1,576 families - 25 per cent were seriously
short of fuel; scraps wore being collected on
the streets.
3,976 families - 63 per cent were in arrears on
life insurance premiums. Host of the families
were in debt for more t-an $500.00, The average
debt was $224.00.
74 per cent borrowed from telatives or friends.
50 per cent of those having life insurance
borrowed the full surrender value.
25 per cent showed saving*s bank paBa books,
with the accounts closed.
50 per cent were eking out eacistance on food
baskets obtained irregularly from those relief
agencies which do not investigate their; cases.
1,500 families sold or pawned furniture to buy
food.
A large percentage of the families reported
discouragement, bitterness, and in many cases
t e breaking up of the home, as children could
hot be cared for. (1)
The picture described by those data above is indeed dark and

(1)

Stuart Chase, A Hew Deal (The Kaciailian Co., New York, 1932)
p. 111-112.
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dreary and to think that it repr senta only a small number of the
cases in New York alone, makes one visualize the iwnanne magnitude
of the problem.

This large number of unemployed people has been the

result of the closing of factories, manufacturing plants and other
industrial producing agencies throughout the nation.

Lack of suffi

cient capital on the part of the employers and others who carry on
their producing with infested and borrowed capital, has been the
renson for their closing.

The public on the other hand has not been

able to buy their products because of the low purchasing power of
the dollar, and the apparent closing of the channels throu^i which
money circulates.

In a capitalistic system ouch as ours the inter

relation of the producer to the consumer Is so finloy "woven" to
gether that the least bit of pressure on either is likely tohave a
devastating effect.

And this has been the case in our system result

ing in the millions we have unemployed.
As earefree as the American public has been or is supposed to
be it cannot withstand the constant cry of hungry men, women and
c ildren; of its gigantic factories idle and silend or its money
and securities idle in closed banks, thus the depression and unem
ployment have both been economic causes of the New Deal.
C. - Our Banking Dilemma
Due to the depression, as a main re-ason, our banking structure
had folded or collapsed completely.

"At first gradually, soon with

increasing intensity, the banking system of the country began to sag,
then to collapse.

The initial signs of disaster were visible in

8
Detroit when the leading banks closed; this was followed by the estab-

1 shownt on February 14 of a state wide moratorium for eight days.
But t e banks never reopened and by ! arch 2, there were twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia which had to Join Michigan, either
\sy..

in suspending or in closely restricting banking opera tios.
Federal Reserve system reported widespread hoax-ding.

The

On the eve of

Roosevelt's inauguration the panic had reached the greatest financial
nerve centers of the nation, New York and Chicago, with the result
that the governors of New York and Illinois had announced banking
holida s.

The day of the new President's acception into the office

saw banking operations practically at a standstill in every state
i

the union with all security and comodity exchanges closed." W

Thus was our banking structure struggling under duress that its own
presidents, directors and state officials could not solve.
The depression and all of the factors in our economic set-up
effected by it made it necessary for changes or the inception of new
ideas if our economy was to regain its feet.

Roosevelt, his aides

and a visors gave birth to the idea of the New Deal and it was put
into practice.

3o the New Deal has been the new adminietrations

a swer to the problems that confronted them.

TTTT—
Hacker, A dhort . toiy of the New Deal. (F. S. Cobb, 1934,
New Yoik) p. 19.

Chapter !!•

Tfrmlrtreg aad the SMF Deal

Xbrott h gradual evolution t> c business of hanking hoc uo»
voleped a ccsnplex and confusing ©filiation of epoeialised types*
each devoting itself largely to tie performance of see® control or
rectrictod function# As the groT*~t.~h of tiio oO's^cHiilo syateSii I pis ro*»
vcaled t o possibility of" end supposed ::eed for nso or ieprmred
klnde of hanking* a mm and specialised typo of banking usually
has been created to sseet the supposed seed*^

And so it ic that

bonks and business are inseparably ciod together and eeoh is dopendent upon the other for its life* It is therefore of riajor topertassee tint bosks sstst be kept is the best of Wftlir condition
if business is to progress*
A - Coa/rressiorjal A. ciqn

• .-..r-' hnaktog

On the day of tlie President*s inaugural nearly one half of
the states hod deolarod a btmkin holiday in, a local atteespt to
tfesnrt the crisis that tsas confronting than* It w iianediateXy
nooc. cary for the Federal GoveimaDnt to take a hand to

&zo aattor

and attaapt to solve the problea* la an attaapt to clear up the
banking situation* President Roosevelt ist-ued the following order—
•gheroae it is in the best interest of all bank depositors
tint a period of respito be provided v/itli a vie?/ of pro*
7TT*
•<altcr E* Spohr* Peonocdc Principles and Problems* (lb©
Mocraillan Co. 1034) n» 4? ?. Vol 1#

10.
venting further hoarding of coin, bullion or currency
or speculation in foreign exchange and permitting the
application of appropriate measures to protect the
interest of our people —
HOB1 therefore I, Franklin D. Noosevelt, President of
the United States of /; ;erica, in view of such national
emergency and by virtue of the authority vested in me by
said Act and in order to prevent the export hoarding or
earmarking of gold or silver coin, or bullion or currency,
do hereby proclaim, order, direct ard declare that frcan.
Monday, the sixth day of March, Nineteen. Hundred and Thirty
Throe, both dates inclusive, there shall be maintained and
observed by all banking institutions and all branches thereof
located in the United States of America, including the terri
tories and insular possesions, a bank holiday, and that dur
ing said pperiod all banking transactions shall be suspen
ded."*1*
The order cited above was the President's first move
toward banking recovery.
ihiargency Banking Act.

His next act was the drafting of the

"The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney

General and I were engaged with members of the Senate and House of
representatives in the preparation of the Emergency Banking Act*
suppose a t least a dozen different drafts were edited and

I

re-edited.

"(2)

(1)Eorace Taylor, et. al. (Contemporary Problems) arcourt Braco Co.
New York, 1934. p. 153.
(2)F. D. Eoosovelt, Chi Our bay. The John Day Co., Hew York, 1934.
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"The special session of the Seventy-Third Congress was hurried
ly convened to enact the adminstrators emergency banking bill - a
measure that was introduced, passed and signed in a single day,
March 9, 1933,

One of the last official acts of the same Congress

was to pass the Glass-Steagill banking bill, officially designed
the Banking A^t of 1933; this received the President's signature
on Juno 16•

An amendment to the Emergency Bank Act, which was

approved March 24, authorising the Federal Reserve Banks to make
direct loans to no-member banks and trust companies during the existin

emergency, can be properly included in the first law#51 (*•)
Thus did the President and Congress act quickly to put the bank

ing machinery Imck in -working order and regain, confidence#

"The

kn ention of the Emergency Banking Bill was simple j it ms de
signed to permit the sound banks to reopen and to furnish them
with currency for the purpose of liquefying t eir assests.

Its

ijore important sections provided; that additional Federal Reserve
Bank Motes were to be issued to member bonks up to 100 per cent
of the other rediseounted assests, that is to say, notes, drafts,
bills of exchange and bankers acceptances; that the open market
operations of the Federal Reserve Bank were to be enlarged

by-

permitting them to lend to any persons or corporations notes
secured by government bonds; that rational and state banks which
ivere members of the Federal Reserve System could reopen

aly under

( ^Horace Taylor, et#
Contemporary Problems, (Hareourt Brace
Co., Hew York, 1934) p# 153. "
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lisccn.se from the Treasury (basks sot entirely solvent were to
be placed under the cont rol of conservators and could be operated
only under restrictions)! that the Secretary of tie Treasury could
call in gold certificates in the country! and the S©construction
Finance Corporation was to be authorised subscribe to the preferred
stock, capital notes and debentures of banks and trust ccaupanies."(l)
1MB is a sunniary of the important features of the Banking Act.
As helpful as the act MAY have been intended to be it LAS not BO.
J. T. Flyna in an article titled ''banting Eeal Banking Eeform,"
saus - "The fundamental organic disease which afflicted our banks
w© ignored almost wholly. Instead ve prescribed a iialf dozen
poulticies and lotions and one powerful narcotic. Under the guise
of banning one very vicious type of affiliate we legalised a whole
flock of equally dangerous other kinds of affiliations. We extended
branch banking without providing any safegaurds against its abuse.
We literally, for the first time, expressly legalised and establis ed
holding com any banking under the appearance of providing a thin
and watery form of regulation. We overlooked wholly the one and
great basic condition out of which all our banking troubles have
grown, namely, that our banks had ceased to be primarily banks and
had beeam© fueling companies in enterprises run not by bankers con
cerned with operating banks, but by promoters whose object was to

^ L. iiucker, A Short History of the Hew Deal (F. S. Cobb Co
Bow, York, 1834) p. 50-21.

IS.

exploit the credit resources of the bank. And. then, to complete
t e job at rambling legislation, thus brought together, v.e pro
vided for a guarantee of deposits, leaving most of the ills of
the banks untouched, but putting the public vilig&nee to sleep by
proclaiming that while bankers ^ay to continue to inflict mortal
-spurns upon the banks if they choose to do so, the public need not
interest itself in the matter since it will be protected against
(1)
loss. v ' Ho over, the attempt at banking reform was success
ful in improving the confidence of the American public in our
banks. Whether or not the confidence is well placed in sound
institutions remains to be seen. The immediate problem was solved
but the ultimate problem remains a dark shadow in the future and
must be solved before real banking recovery can take place.

Horace Taylor, et. al.. Contemporary Problems, (liarcourt and
Brace Co., New Yoric, 1S36) pp. 174-175.

Chapter III
IEFLATIOHAHY HEAS0S86

The cost of relief work whether laadung or giving is tremen
dous#

Our Government found itself eanying on this typo of -work

and therefore a need for large amounts of money.

The price level

was far below normal and the administration advisor belbrred "that
the amount of money in circulation determines business activity and
that a government con force soney Into circulation as it pleases
and thus determine the price level as It desires."

The monetary

advisors of Roosevelt, George P. barren and Frank A. Pearson,
have deemed that an inflationary program was necessary for the
recovery from economic strain.

*

The pro; ram advocated by Tiarren and Pearson is not in harmony
with the findings and theories of the leading economists of our
prose t time.

"An increase in the amount of money and credit

in circulation, everything else retraining unchanged, should raise
the price level. An increase In the rapidity of circulation
(velocity) of money and oredit, other factors remaining the some
should cause tie price level to rise.

a similiar manner a

decrease in the amount of goods and services sold, other factors
remaining unchanged, should raise the price level. A reverse^
of thooe conditions should have an opposite effect upon the price
level.
But there are other considerations to be borne in mind.
price level is not always a passive factor or the mere resultant

The
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of the other factors mentioned. Certain psychological conditions
nay cause the price level to rise or fall more rapidly than changes
in qua titles of purchasing power and of goods and services other—
wise justify. If the mass of people believe that the chief indi
cations point -to a rapid rise in the price level, they will tend
to bid up prices more rapidly than is justified by the exchange
relationship which would probably exist between the volume of
circulating medium, on the one hand and goods and services on the
ether, of the rise in the price level were not anticipated. In
other wnrds tit© price level may be a cause as well as a rasultj
it may be active as well as passive.

The theory has been

proven true, however, those theories given Roosevelt by barren
and Pearson have not been in harmony with it. It is quite logical
to think then, that the inflationary measures used by the adminis
tration, in part hove not boon the best, or the monetary policies,
but the measures used have alleviated the condition to cone ex
tent and as the measures continue to worl they my prove mora use
ful, this however is doubtful.
A- DEPARTURE FROM T??E GOLD STANDARD
One of the first steps taken by the President toward re
lieving the pressure cm our monetary machinery was a departure
from the gold standard. "A gold standard exists when gold has
been adopted by a country as its standard metal, and when the
^ alter E. Spahr, et. al». Economic Principles and Problems
(Ferrer and ^Leahart, Inc., Hew York, 1934) Vol. I. p. 442.
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units of value ere expressed in toms of gold, smd. idim the goM
Is freely coined and Is all legal tender. It irsplles, also, tSmt
all ot or xsonoy In th© country is mintoined at par udth gold,
and that freedom of narrsaeBft of the ©old Into and out of the country
is unrestricted except In so far as interest rules act as .tonodi—
mccits in the freo novoncnt of the specie. ^

Bscsuae the gold

standard taas thought to hare boon end probably is 13JO best nonotary standard* Our noneteury stan ards are expressed in Imw of
nancy unite "which in noct promiling oeoaa&lc systeoo are spocio
unite. All credit units are expressed In terns

of the nanny or

- standard unit* Every country oast adopt eaem unit of as&surojaent, corxj standard by «ftich all mines will be r sac >r«d*

In

this country, for essartplo, as in most leading countries (except
where these countries ham ta^orc.rily abandoned the old stan
dard), the unit is in terms of gold. Our unit is the dollar of
ISS/SI grains of

old 0/l0. ^

Ihus me our nonetoxy unit de

fined before the departure frcm t! o standard and & Ineetalng of
t o gold content f our dollar*
Because of the simplicity end oasc of lading our credit
and no .ey in teres of gold standard, vsc had retained

it until

the out Doal*s inception* "JVelininrr stops indicated tret the
t&sited States mo soon destined to go off the gold standard
(1) IMW tV
Doonomie Principles anil
end Fdnelart, Inc., Ikw Yatk0 19S4) pp. 409"vol. 1.
(2) Ibid, pp. 396*

along with Host of the outstanding nations of the world.

On Llarch

10, 1933, the President issued an executive order to halt the ex
port of gold oxcept w en licensed by the 'Treesuryj on April 15,
the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates was
forbidden; and on April 19, the United States formliy departed
from the gold standaed when an executive ordor stopped t! e free
movement of tie metal.

The document declared that tie earmarking

for foreign account and tie export of gold, bullion gold, and
gold certificates from t e United States was prohibited,

She

Secretary of tie Treasury was authorized to investigate, regulate
or prohibited, and transactions in foreign exchange and the export
or withdrawal of currency from the United States,

To achieve the

same result in a samesdiat different way the Gold Repeal Joint
Resolution, approved June 5, 1933, cancelled the gold clause in
all federal and private obligations and made contracts and debts
payable in legal tender, ^
Thus did the Hew Deal Administration clear ti e path for the
inception of any inflationary measures deemed necessary to recovery,
B - THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
" As passed by Congress and a; proved by the President on Llay
12, 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment A<«t, properly titled "An
Act to relieve the Existing national Emergency by increasing

(1) L, Hacker, The hone fairy Policies of the Hew Deal
& Co,, lew York, 1935) pp,54.

(F. S, Cobbe

7f

v
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i^ricultural Purchasing Power," contains bhree different parts#
/
*
\ One part empowers tlie President, through the Secretary of
- \

Agriculture to increase agricultural purchasing power by raising
farm income; another empowers the Fana Credit Administration to
/

tqke measures to lighten the load of farm mortgages; the third
4 giants to the President certain powers in regard to the national
I currency and credit.^

It is the third part of the Act tliat

/ i deals with the monetary policies and therefore our point of
J

H'

•

I intorest.
ItffJ
'The Agricultural Adjust eat A t of May 12, 1933 embodied
/

the first positive efforts to increase the amount of money in
circulation.

It should be noted, however, that the Administra

tion in this law won its initial battle to prevent inflation
by statutory order, for the Act did not require tie President
to carry out its terms but merely authorized him to do so "in
his discretion."

lie could undertake one

r all of t o following

in order to expand creditj (l) Require the Federal Reserve Banks
to conduct open market operations, United States securities up
to t: G value of 03,OCX),000,000.00.
worth of United States notes.

(2) Issue up to £3,000,000,000.00

Ihis paper currency could be used

by the government only in retioing outstanding Federal obliga
tions, hut of course, It was to be legal tender for all public
and private debts.

(3) Reduce the gold content of the dollar as

much as 53 per cent, and set up a bimetallic system a%d provide
(1) The Agricultural Adjustment Act and its Operation (.The
' Agricultural Adjustment Administration, TJashington, 1933) pp. 1.

19.

for the unlimited coinage of both gold and siIvor at ratios fixed
by him*

(4)

Accept for a period of six months, silver from

foreign governments in payment of their indebtnoss to the United
States at a price of not more than 50 per cent an ounce* However,
not more than $200,000,000*00 worth of silver was to be taken on
/ the account of t! e intergovernmental debts* ^
•

Insnodiately after the enactment of the measures or measure

there was a noticable rise in the price range of all commodities*
The Hew Deal's action in relation to the relieving of pressure
on the farmers seemed to have been successful* During the harvest
season of 1933, when our farm products went to market prices again
took a decided drop and once again the attention of the President
and Congress turned to price fixing and monetary problems*

The

next step taken by the A(3ministration was the devaulation of the
dollar as a relief measure*
C - DOTJAP DgrAL'IATIOS
The increasing rate of unrest due to the fall of prices
during the harvest soason of 1933 spurred t o Administration to
new activity* "To still the growing clamor of t? e inflationists
the President on October 22 announced a new policy, the govern
ment

would purchase gold freshly mined in the United States and

also (by announcement three days a tor) foreign gold, at figures
to be determined by the Rpconstruction Finance Corporation*

In

this way a progressively cheaper value on the dollar would be sot*
The immediate purpose of the device wore "to res ore the price
level" and "to restore a balance in the price structure so tl at
(1) I* hdc -cf, A b oft b'org of SR6 .,<M Deftl , (F. £>. fflbUB"
f y On.
tWr ^*H»i
' m . WJI.-WW •
—

20.
;

' /.;

/

u

farmers may exchange their products for Hie products of industry
on a farmer excaug© basisj the ultimate goal was to be the
establishment and' raaSntewmce

of "a dollar" which will not change

its purchasing power nor debt paying power.
The Reconstruction Finance Co poration at once began buying
gold and continued the operation for a number of months j the
dollar began to decline in relation to foreign currency} commodity
prices, lioveyer did not rise correspondingly.

Thus between

October 25 and Larch 10, the dollar depriciated 6.8 per cent in
foreign exchange, while the price of cotton advanced only 1.6 per
cent.

In the two weeks fror. October 24 to Eovemher 6, tie general

level of wholesale commodity prices actually fell, according to
t is weekly index of the Annalist from 103.8 to 103.

Ttm Hew

York Hues comment was pertinent} "Hie disparity between fee
in

fall

e gold value of t c dollar, and the reagre advance in sensi

tive prices on the speculative commodity and stock exchanges is
raarlccd when it is recalled that prices should, in theory, show a
percentage of advance greater than fee
of the dollar.

By fee

percentages of the fall

end of 1953 the net depreciation of the

dol ar in terns of gold, amounted to 11.4 per cent. '1*'
The Administration was also faced with the issue of helping
the silvo miners and

hose wiio held silver interests.

Their de-

oande could not be overlooked and the President in coalition vn th
Congress passed the Silver Purchase Bill,
hope in fee

various speeches

the President expressed

and messages that ot or countries
u-

"• '"bfa

4 e°~

a.
would join in the romcnelisation of silver. Fay B» FesterfieId,
Profess or of Political Economy at Yale University and Honorary
Chairman of the Economist's Katicna Committee on Monetary Polices
says In Ms hook, "Cur Silver Delete" "At test the President's ^message ms nothing bettor then, a
political surrender to or compromise with the active silver!tee
and inflationists who had been besieging hin and throating hostile
action by Congress. He had himself set the trap in TMOh hd was
caught. He had made inflation a key policy of his administration.
He lad promised higher prices and had indulged the gold mining
interests with & 0 % increase in the prieo of gold. He had
promised to ]ielp the farmer and the debtor by any and every in
flationary device ii necessary. Silver speculations justifiably
expected that he w uld do as well b; silver as he did by gold.
Flier, the head of the nation adopts the policy of subsidising spoiial
clascos, it is difficult to stop short and deny highly organised
politically active minorities their slice of public bacon.

ow-

ever disillusioned he had become about the efficacy of gold pur
chase and devaluation of raising the rice level (and curing the
depression, he had to go on now and purchase silver and raise its
price, even if he reslized it ms absurb and unjust. "Prom the
picture painted it seems as the President and Congress were forced
int. this particular policy and which ms advocated by them 'to
bring aid to a particular group. Professor Westerfield continues "The Administration's Silver Purchase Bill was passed by
Congress on June 11, 1934. Its provisions include the followingt

22.
1. It is declared to be the policy of the United States that
the proportion of silver to gold in the monetary stocks of the
United States shall be increases, with the ultimate objective of
having and maintaining one-fourth of the monetary value of such
stocks of silver*
2* The Secretary
6f the Treasury is authorized and directed
f*
to buy silver at home and abroad at such rates, times, and terns
as he dooms reasonable and most advantageous to the public interest.
Such purchases are not to bo made at a price in excess of the xxmetary value (now 1.29 a f'ne ounce) and in the case of silver
situated in the United States on lay 1, 1934, at a price exceed
ing 50 cents a fine ounce.
3. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the
President, is authorized to soel silver acquired under the hat
whenever the market price exceeds tie monetary value and the yevernmexit stock of silver exceeds 25% of the monetary stocks of

old

and silver, provided tint tho sales do not reduce te silver required
as security for outstanding silver certificates.
4. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to
issae silver certificates in an amount not loss than the cost of
silver purchased, or, at tho discretion of the Secretary, in an
amount equal to t e monetary values of the silver purchased,

flic so

and all ot er silver certificates are to be secured by silver
f
e
bullion and silver coins having a monetary value (01.29) or rial to
t e amount of th© certificates; they ar made a legal to: x

and

redeemable on demand in smniard silver dollars.
5. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of* t o

3.
President, is etnpowered to invest! ato, regulate or prohibit the
acquisition, importation, ecxportation, or transportation of silver
and to require re orts as to the facts involved* fhis authority
may be exercised only when necessary to effectuate the policy of
the law*
6. Ihc President is aut orizod to require, by executive order,
the delivery of silver to the stints regardless of who the owner or
holder of the metal my be or rf orocrer in the United States the
silver nay be situated. Silver withheld in violation of this pro
vision is to be forfeited to the government and the person with
holding the metal is to bo subject to a penalty equal to twice the
monetary value of the silver. The silver so delivered is to be
added to the monetary stocks and the T.eners are to receive the
monetary value of the silver loss ti e deduction of such seigni
orage as the President may determine to be fair, and the Treasury
is to boor the cost of transportation and charges.
7. The Stamp Act is amended to provide a transfer valued 50$
of the profits which result tram speculative activities in silver,
the tax applies to transfers made on or after May 15, 1934. It
applies to transfers to the United States Government except the
transfers try deposits or delivery at a United States Mint (a) Under
the President's Proclamation of Decanber 21, 1933, relating to the
coinage of nearly mined domestic silver, and (b) in compliance with
the provision of the silver purchase act. Which authorizes the
President to require any and all silver to bo delivered to the
mint. ^
Eras we have the import and isca,sures of Ei© Silver Purchase

24.
Act which embodies the raon t' ry policy used by the ^dnunistr tion
in regards to silver.

And now that we have the administration's

action taken toward gold and silver let us continue with its attempt
at raising the price level by devaluation of the dollar.^)
"Hie President's hope of raising prices by
dollar soon proved illusory.

evaluating the

Indeed it was pointed out to him as

early as Move? bar 16, 1933, by Professor 0. K. 8 >rague, that this
confidence for recovery by this method did not have t e slig test
relation to economic reality,

is Professor Sprague m id, "'But

r

ore

dap eciation of t e currency in relation to the currencies of other
countries will

ot bring about a general rise in prices."

At a time

when t ere is 1 rge excess plant capacity and millions of unemployed
was e earners, an advance in prices that has any oro;;<ise of being
maintained, requires ti e develop; ent of conditions that will permit
a sustained de and for more later arid more materials, with resultant
increase in the production of goods and services and a higher at ndard
of living. ^
Hio above s atement by Professor Pprague was the co :ensu8 of
opinions of all other leading monetary economists.

The theories of

Darren and Pearson - the theories of the New Deal - hni® been examined
and proven to fail in hastening recovery.

"Hie most vital

>oint of conflict

between the theories of Darren and those of the great majority of
monetary economists is whether the problem of business recovery is a
currency question as

arren thinks, or whether, as a at ant I orities

believe, it is a question of enabling the producer to reau me his

(1) Louis Hacker, A Short History of The New Deal.
New York, 1935) PP. 57-58
(2) Ibid , p. 58.

3. Job us, Co.,
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activities, after iiich the necessary currency will flow into circula
tion.

I'onotary experts hold that business cannot be revived in a

sound manner until business men have reduced the r inventories to a
noxr&l or satisfactory level and have lowered the r costs below
selling prices; tnat the amount of money in circulation is
rain ed

ater

rimarily by such business activity and does not cause it;

th t there is no sound ,:ay to force money in circulation with the ex
pectation that it will revive business when business isai are not
borrowing or using their bank deposits; and that there is no

nown

way, which is sound, to increase consumer purchasing power by manipu1 ting tie currency, for the reason that consumer purchasing power,
with a few minor ex options, is derived from the activities
producers,

f

in short, monetary economists hold th t busi ess re

covery is generated by changing our currency system,

onetary

economists maintain that the currency in circulation is merely the themoraatlar recording the state of business, whereas

arren apparently

supposes that he can change the health of business by changing the
seals on the thermometer by destroying the thermometer.
"he monetary theories held by

arren and Pearson, uersonal

advisors of the Administration, therefore the Hew Deal's policies
are in direct contrast to the theories held by Professor Dprague,
-pahr a d other leading monetary economists.
President peraervered in his course.

"Never-the-less, the

On /ecenber 21, anting on the

autuoritygiven him by the Agricultural Adjustment Act, cited above,
President Roosevelt ordered the treasury during the next few years to

buy all the silver mined in the United States - corning to approximately
24,000,000 ounces annually - at 64g- cents an ounce.
above the market level on the day in question},

(This was 21a cents

un January 15, 1934,

haa asked to enact a measure which would directly allow the dollar
devaluation,

""he new bill was to give the

resident power, (1) to fix

r

the limits for devaluation of the dollar at from 50 to 60 cants in
tarns of gold content, (2) to authorize him to manage t e dollar within
these limits of its old gold content, by changing, or making such
ohances in its value as he deemed neeeaBaryj (3) To impound in the
Treasury the vast stocks of gold held by the rederal Reserve Banks;
(4) i'o assure to t e government whatever profit mi ht result from an
increase in the value of t is metal; and (5) To use part of this
profit to create a fund of #2,000,000,000.00 which to stabalize the
dollar.
Congress immediately complied the hill was carried by both
houses a d signed January 30, and two days later Roosevelt fixed the
value of t e dollar at 59.06 cents in terns of its old purity.

The

value of t e maneuver as a price fixing or raising device stood as
follows; From Atpril 19, 19l33, when the gold standard had been abandoned
to Jay 1, 1934, the wholesale price commodity index of 174 com: odities
as compiled by the Departent of labor rose 22 p r cent, in the same
period, the gold content of the dollar was reduced 41 per cent,

it

w s inevitable therefore, that the administration should yeild before
the gpoiing pressure of the inflationists, particularly the Gilverites.
Though the monetary theories of the

ew Deal have seemed to hinge on

inflation, however v rious authorities answer differently as to the

(1}. JL.
R
w

acker, A 3hort

istory of the new Deal, r.

Cob »s & Co.
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prospect of Inflation. Said Professor James Hnrvey Sogers of Yale
University, "I rake a very definite answer therefore to the prospect
of inflation.

It is directly dependent upon the control of the

nationil budget,

if a balance within the next few years can be

definitely provided for a d clearly Ibrseen, the spectre of tincontrolled inflation can be dismissed.
approaches to a
recently

If, on the other and, future

ell-ordered and gradually balancing ach asthe one

roooaed t

Congress are to receive the disrupting treatment

given that one, the prospect of inflation is very grave indeed.
"It was budgeted difficulties that produced all the post-war
inflation in 3urope.

If we have inflation, it will be because our

budget gets out df oontrol.
prospect of inflation can be

I think therefore, the problem of the
reduced to these terms," -

With the advice nd opinions of such eminent economists as
Professor iiprague, iipahr, Hogers, whether directly or indirectly,
and the direct advice of Tarren and Pearson, the rogram of the
?tew Deal moves on.

Inflation has not been allowed to run it, nor

has the general public suffered as a result of the raonet&ry policies
now in practice.

Then these theories were >ut in practice an emergency

held sway and radical immediate action was necessary,

oo with due

credit to the administration's advisors and their ideas, m can say
that they have worked.

Chapter IV.
Conclusion

Sow that the monetary policies of' the Lew Deal imve been
in operation let us "take a brief survey of the condition of our
monetary standing or reactions to the: as a result of these policies.
"In one of the most important monetary acts since devaluation
.

of the dollar, the Treasury revealed plans today to concentrate
•<-

control of currency in the Federal/Government.
A plan to strip national banks of their power to issue money
and call in national bank notes to be replaced by Federal Reserve
notes tss announced by acting Secretary of the Treasury, Thomas
Jefferson Collidge.
The Federal Government as a part of the program will draw on

its gold devaluation profits to retice #674,625,030.00 of tiro
5
national debt. Tire maneuver will save the Government $3,QQO$OQO
annually in interest.
Trie bonds to be reticed beer "Circulation" privileges are
!

*

pledged by national banks with the Treasury to back most of the
$557,937.080.00 ef outstanding bank notes.
The Sew Federal Reserve Hotes will be backed by gold of not
I
less than 40 per cert of their face value. Use national bank notes
to be called in this summer are backed 100 per cent by Government
bonds pledged with the treasury by the issuing banks. The immediate
effect will be simplification of the nations currency system and

vesting in the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks all authority
to issue money*
By calling the "circulation11 privilege bonds and allowing this
privilege on other bonds to expire in July, the Government will de
prive national banks of t e right to issue money, a practice they
have engaged in profitably since the Civil War*
The plan m said to carry definite monetary inflation impli
cations in that it represents a spending of the Government's gold
profit and widens the gold base to support potential expansion*
Offieials avoided reference to inflation possibilities, but
conceded it would "pit gold to work, which can be expanded#"
They pointed out complete control over issua ces of money is placed
in the hands of the Federal Government for the first time as a con
trolling safegaurd over possible expansion*
Government officials said the move was anot. or stop in the
simplification of the monetary system and a vesting of complete
power over issuance of money in the bands of the Federal Government*^)
These then, have been some of the results of the Sew Deal's
monetary policies, and they seem satisfactory, in that they allow
for possible expansion of our currency but with a possible control
over such expansion. Let us take a look at some of tlx© coci ents
by some of our leading monetary economists*
Professor Edwin Miter Kesamerer, monetary and banking authority
writing in the Hew York Sun, said that the use of a portion of the

^The Hew York Sun, March 11, 1935.
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dollar devaluation profit to extinguish circulation bonds as "the
best my to avoid inflation.11 To the extent that the effect of
the plan is to replace national bank notes with other f'oras of
money. Professor Kemmerer declared, it would be merely "one
hand washing the other.8
"If the Treasury were issuing more gold certificates, without
at ti e same time forcing the retirement of almost as much other
money,8 he continued "there would be a net expansion of currency.
So long as a portion of the gold profit remained unallocated
this expansion was possible at any time and, in fact, to a sin11
degree it has been happening.8 Dr. Kemmerer, referred to the
deposit of gold certificates issued against small portions of
the free gold and deposited from time to time in the Treasury's
checking account in the Federal Heserve banks. Summing up Dr.
Keraaerer observed that so far as the present announced intention
of the treasury was concerned, he saw nothing dangerous or irvfaltionary in it.8 ^
Another monetary authority, an economists for a large hall
Street bank, declared in his opinion that the Treasury's a nouncoaent was a "good move," chiefly because 8it buries tie gold profit
where inflationists and spenders can't get it.8 Furthermore, he
declared it displayed a commendable attitude on the part of the
Treasury as to the disposition of the revaluation profit and it
also revealved a degree of monetary knowlege that was refreshing.
To the extent that the amount of bonds to be redeemed exceeded the
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circulation issued against tfeeaa, this economist oo tinned bank
reserves would be inilated•

He added that if other forms of

Government bonds temporarily bearing the circulation privileges
lost that privilege in July through the Home Loan Bank Bill according circulation collateral value, the banks would

ave to put up

the cash to replace the cash now used for its security#
Elimination of so large an amount of Government securities
from the assets of tie banks, together with the slight addition
to their excess reserveswhich the operation will produce is calcu
lated to induce the banks to buy more Government issues to replace
at least a portion of the securities which are being "called#

To

that extent the elimination of old circulation bonds may indirectly
hold future debt refunding possibilities#
Indirect advantages which the Treasury will receive are several#
The reminder of the profit arising from dollar devaluation aside
from the portion already set aside in the stabilisation fund will
have been used#

This will render impossible the earmarking of

portiors of the gold profit for other projects, such as, for in
stance, a soldier bonus, unless prevision is made to take the money
out of t e stabilisation fund or from other Government cash resources#"
Said Professor Irving Fisher, Yale

economists and monetary

exrert about the action taken by the Treasury "The plan seems as excellent one for which I have hoped
for sometime," he said#

"The chief use of devaluation

should bo increasing the numbers of dollars in gold
by decreasing the weight of the dollar#

The number

of dollars thus created by decreasing their weight was
2.8 billinos, but hither to these additional gold dollars
lave been kept in the Treasury#
I have no doubt That any undue inflation will be avoided, as
I an sure the administration has no intention of an thing more than
the mild reflation necessary to recovery#
Professor Fisher saw three advantages in the Treasury's move First through involving a relatively snail sum, he felt'it
would have a stimulating effect because it gave notice that the
President's original premise to restore our lost circulating
medium#
Second, it will lighten the Government's burden of debt#
Third, it will work toward unification of the currency system#
He says the method as controlled reflation rather than uftcontr oiled

inflation#

Hie President could reverse this procedure,

he said, by issuing bonds for gold, then by keeping control#"(1)
Still another economist and former executive to the Secretary
of the Treasury, said "that the Gover,.client's plan to utilize the
$ 42f000,000#00 of its profit from devaluation of the dollar to
retice some of its bonds, indicated confidence on the part of the
Treasury to hadle future bond financing#
I had supposed the gold poof it would be held for Government
bonds in case they are weak#" Dr. Spra;?ue said, the plan socms
to indicate the confidence on the part of the Treasury to handle
future financing of bonds#"
Hie plan to eliminate the national bank currency and replace
^

The liew York Cua> March 11, 1935#
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it with Federal Reserve notes was termed "of no groat importance
by Dr. Sprague."
Dr. Sprague said he did not believe the plan would lead to
inflation of any sort.* ^
Thus do the various leading monetary economists repress them
selves about some of the policies advocated by the adrainistrarion.
Inflation pure and single has rust been used as a poliey yet, Ihs
partial inflation 1ms been kept under control and by careful farther
r anipulation of our currency uncontrolled inflation can be avoided.
Further agreement of the Hew Deal recovery program is voiced by
wr
another monetary specialist, "E onamic recovery is making rapid
strides in every country save a few.

I believe its full attainment

to be impossible without monetary stabilization at heme and abroad.
I believe that once monetary stabilisation is readied in and be
tween the principal nations of the earth, a period of pronounced
prosperity will

ensue j and I equally believe that in order to

preserve that new prosperity and to avert the recurrence of fresh
disaster, the leading nations nust work together in the monetary
field in an endeavor so to regulate and coordinate their credit
policy that undue fluctuations in usiness activity with the atten
dant sharp variations in price levels, fluctuations which are
attributable to monetary causes, nay be studied and kept in check.(2)
Wft.

(2)

T rk

S,n.

It "#•

Rusrel Lef^ingwell, Proceedin 2 of the Academy of Political Science,
Economic R covory
TWrnc-frnry •
Vol. yVTI.
ho. 1. pg? 93.
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And it is toward monetary stabilization that the monetary
policies of the Hew D©al declare working. Other nations are
working toward the sane thing and by cooperation it is expected
that new monetary standards for international trade will be set
up. Optimism on the part of monetary economists in the united
States is representative of most of tie producers,

ith minor

returns being carried on in the banking system and a new note of
confidence in the Treasury department complete recover should
become a. reality.
Such has been some of the major monetary policies of the
New Deal and the results derived therefrom. Recovery from
i

depression is not complete because of- discrepancies in, net
only the monetary policies, but other steps taken, by the Govern
ment toward recovery. By continued efforts to improve the policies
already in practice and their evolution into new ones, the Hew
Deal*s monetary policies should bring recovery and finally monetary
stabili ation.
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